European Union Antitrust Laws have been successfully applied to anti-competitive behaviour, which can take place abroad, but have an effect within the EU. Under Antitrust Laws, not only abuse of dominant position practices but also mergers that restrain competition are regarded as illegal and subject to severe remedies. 
Introduction
The wealth of a nation consists of all goods that fulfil the consumer's wants, therefore increasing wealth means expanding the quantity, quality and variety of consumer goods. The idea of a free and decentralized market with a socially optimal allocation has been alive among economists, since the time of Adam Smith's "indivisible hand". However, we must notice that real market conditions are characterized by market structures between perfect competition and monopoly. Hence, conditions dominated by imperfect competition, asymmetric information or external effects make competitive equilibria socially inefficient -typical in nowadays industries in the new economy.
The problem is that the above analysis is a static one vis-à-vis dynamic models that take into account that efforts to become a monopoly and enjoy high prices are the engine of the competitive innovation process, although such efforts might be wasteful. Monopoly profits are also an important signalling tool that stimulates competition, as the higher the monopolist price, the higher the incentive of rival firms to take part in these profits by undercutting the monopolist. Thus, economic theory has shown that monopoly pricing is not always inefficient, and that is why I will analyse/model the Microsoft-WMP case as an example of a controversial issue among economists.
Monopoly pricing is a de facto major concern of antitrust: if firms seek to raise their profits through merger, they must attain governmental/EU approval; when a firm abuses of its dominant position by performing anti-competitive strategies, such actions are not only unenforceable, but also subject to criminal charges in EU jurisdiction. For the past years, the Commission has focused primarily on facilitating market entry rather than on regulating "unfair" prices per se (emphasis in thus shifting from "fair" competition into free competition). Monopoly pricing regulation is thus a microcosm of competition policy. 2 Market power is the main concern of the international antitrust policy. 3 From a public policy point of view, market power has negative and positive implications, which often makes antitrust policy ambiguous if not paradoxical. The negative implications of market power are, inter alia:
wealth transfer from the consumers to the firm; loss in efficiency; and rent-seeking. 4 The most positive implication is the incentive to innovate, thus it leads to dynamic efficiency (i.e. technological progress) with respect to certain goods. It follows that increasing market power is a necessary but not sufficient condition of every (core) antitrust offence. There is no question that competition is an issue of primary importance in open market economy -it leads to price reduction, innovation, better efficiency and wider choice for consumers. The definition of the relevant market is, ab initio, one of the most important, if not the decisive, problem concerning antitrust law 5 .
The proposed merger between Volvo and Scania was notified to the European Commission on 22 -Page 4 -dominant position" 7 in the PC operating systems market. By tying WMP to its OS, the EC said the company is unfairly harming its competitors' products. The imposed remedy required Microsoft offer its Windows OS without WMP and also to disclose its proprietary technical information so rivals can build products that are compatible with Microsoft's OS. And, finally, the EC imposed its largest fine everover EUR 497 million.
A General Overview of the EU Competition Policy

8
The aim of EU competition policy is, per definitionem, to promote competition and create a single market, which goes beyond national borders as well as to promote the process of economic integration 9
. Competition policy is a mean to ensure wider consumer choice, technological innovation and effective price competition. There are four pillars of EU competition policy: antitrust & cartels, market liberalization, state aid control, and abuse of dominance and merger control 10 . Due to the cases analysed in this paper I will refer only to the first and fourth points.
Anticompetitive practices are per definitionem strategies intentionally designed to limit the degree of competition inside a market. Such actions can be taken by one firm in isolation or a number of firms engaged in explicit or implicit collusion. Examples of anticompetitive practices are, inter alia:
predatory pricing, vertical restraint in the market, creation of artificial barriers to entry, and collusive practices. 11 Practices are not prohibited if the respective agreements "contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical progress in the market". 12 In a free and decentralized market, business is a competitive game. Sometimes, companies may be tempted to avoid competing with each other and try to set their own rules of the game. The European Commission, per se, acts as the referee to ensure that all companies play by the same rules. 
Anti-Trust Policy -Abuses of a Dominant Market Position
Antitrust is the study of competition. It is a bundle of laws that seek to ensure competitive markets through the interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange. Antitrust law is centered on a primary principle that society is better off if markets behave competitively. Figure 1 
European Merger Policy (Figure 2)
The main issue about these cases is whether a proposed merger or takeover is thought to lead to a substantial lessening of competitive environment in the market and risks leading to a level of market concentration (calculations theoretically based on Lerner and Bain Indexes) when collusive behaviour might become a reality.
Often a merger is allowed to progress without any intervention by the competition authorities when the economic benefits of allowing the integration to take place are significantly greater than the potential costs. Here are some of the main justifications for approving a merger between two businesses: efficiency arguments
14
, the role of the capital markets, market contestability arguments, the capital investment argument, the globalization argument, and mergers as a means of enhancing economic integration within the EU. As counter-arguments we have: monopoly power, mixed evidence on benefits of mergers, imperfections in capital markets, and employment effects. . 25 The decisive factor influencing the Commission's decision was, the determination of the relevant product and geographic market. 
The Internationalization of Antitrust Policy -A Global Competition Policy and the Challenges ahead
Market definition
The analysis of the relevant product market is simple. The truck market is classified in three categories: light duty trucks (less than 6 tons), medium duty trucks (5-16 tons) and heavy duty trucks (more than 16 tons). 27 The heavy truck market is then subdivided into two segments: Rigid trucks and tractor trucks ( Figure 6 ). While it is known that rigids and tractors may not be fully substitutable, the final conclusion is that the category of heavy trucks constitutes the single relevant market. Light and medium duty trucks are thus not included. Law, Spring 2002-06-21, p.39-40, 42-47. market as the national market of each of the Nordic countries, Ireland and the UK (different from Volvo and Sweden's contention that the relevant geographic market was EEA-wide). While, the new VolvoScania's share of the western European market would have been around 30%, its share of the market of the Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, was estimated at an average of 2/3 and 90%, respectively (Figure 7 and 8) . In its notification, Volvo relied on a series of non-price factors meant to support the argument that the relevant geographic market was EEA-wide, namely (a) the emergence of large, private, trans-border purchasers, who have knowledge of prices and competitive conditions in other Member
States when negotiating with distributors of trucks; (b) the emergence of dual sourcing, which ensures independence of customers from any single manufacturer; (c) product standardization, which resulted in the fact that the same basic truck can be sold and used throughout Europe; and (d) the absence of entry barriers for nondomestic producers. However, the Commission counterbalanced the above arguments, with the following: First, there are substantial price and markup differences across countries -different price-elasticities of demand ( Figure 9 ). Second, the models and technical configurations differ considerably, because of local consumer preferences and national technical requirements. Third, the selective and exclusive distribution system links the sales and after-sales services. The importance of profits from after-sales service may therefore induce dealers to charge higher prices to foreign customers.
Finally, there are large variations in market shares across countries.
Assessment
The Commission Decision explicitly describes its methodology for assessing the creation or In its market share analysis the Commission also underlined that the merging firms' joint market share had remained stable, and showed no tendency to decline. Finally, the Commission pointed out the large difference between the joint market share of the merging parties and the market share of the largest remaining competitor in most of the five countries.
The Commission supplemented its market share analysis with qualitative factors. First, the extent of brand loyalty and the customer structure was considered (the Commission found indicators of considerable brand loyalty and of a dispersed customer structure). The Commission concluded that there was little customer purchasing power to compensate for the increased market power by the merging firms. Second, the possibility of entry was studied. The Commission claimed that competing undertakings faced substantial barriers of entry into the relevant markets, especially in Sweden, inter alia, due to the following: (a) the Nordic markets were small and sparsely populated; (b) the existence in Sweden by legislation of the special "cab crash test", a crash safety test for truck-driver seats functioning as a technical barrier to trade and (c) the need to establish a high service network level. With all these conditions, the Commission found that it was highly improbable that sufficiently effective competition would remain in the examined countries after the merger of Volvo and Scania, even though some efficiency reasons presented by Volvo. (Figure 10) 
Remedies
The commitments involved, inter alia, allowing car dealers and servicing companies full freedom to sell and service competing makes, that Volvo during a two year period would refrain from selling heavy trucks under the brand name of Scania and that certain of Scania's bus production units would be sold off.
Moreover, both parties must not only reduce their collective market power, but also restore conditions for effective competition, which would be distorted as a result of the merger. Probably, the Commission would have accepted divestiture, which is the most preferred remedy in merger cases. News reports indicated that divestiture of Scania's bus operations and elimination of the Scania truck brand in
Ireland and the Nordic states were among remedies suggested by the Commission to the parties, however, not accepted by the latter.
.5 Conclusion
In view of the above, the Commission has come to the conclusion that the notified concentration was incompatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, since, it would create dominant positions in certain the markets, which would result in competition being significantly impeded in the common market within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.
29
The Volvo/Scania Decision illustrates what a decisive impact of the relevant the market definition has in competition cases such as this 30 . On this point, the concentration would have resembled a monopoly situation. Nordic customers would have been the most affected by an increase in prices linked to absence of competitive pressure, since they had been paying even more prior to the merger (Figure 11 ).
One could consider three ways in which horizontal mergers might create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded: a merger may create or strengthen a dominant position of the only large firm in an industry ("a firm with a paramount market position"); a merger may diminish the degree of competition in a concentrated market by eliminating important competitive constraints ("non-collusive oligopolies"); and a merger may create or reinforce a situation where competition is reduced by co-ordination ("increased risk of co-ordination"). (Figure 12 ) 
-Page 10 -
The specific case in hands comprises the three situations in case the merger would have been allowed to happen. In that case consumers would be worse off, as one can show with a "welfare analysis"
according to different countries ( Figure 13 ). It is easy to see that the largest fall in consumer surplus and largest increase in industry profit occurs in the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland) . When looking at the change in welfare it is worth noticing that only negative sings appear in the presented table.
Now suppose that the merger would imply some kind of "cost efficiencies" (Figure 14) . Even though, one could see that whatever the percentage of cost efficiency chosen, in the Nordic countries consumers would be always worse off as their loss in surplus would outweigh the profit gain by producers (VolvoScania). The overall conclusion is, then, a welfare reduction for society in the case of merger. -Page 11 -dominance. A 90% market share means that applications released by Microsoft become the de facto standard, regardless they are the best tools. (Figure 15) The argument that the efficiencies derived from incorporating WMP into Windows prevail over the anti-competitive effects was dismissed. The commission observed that the incorporation of WMP in
The Microsoft -WMP Case
Windows "sends signals which deter innovation". It used new evidence from updated market shares to illustrate how Microsoft's server and media-player had advanced at the expense of rivals. But it did confirm that Microsoft was exploiting its desktop dominance in workgroup server software; and that, by "tying" WMP to Windows, it had overtaken its chief rival in the media-player market, RealNetworks 38 .
( Figure 16 ) A difficult aspect of the law is that Article 82 places emphasis on the protection of competition that already exists, rather than on pursuing the introduction of new.
Remedies
The simplest one was a fine that reflected the "gravity and duration" of the infringement.
European antitrust law allows violators to be fined as much as 10% of their annual worldwide revenues.
In addition, Microsoft would be required to license its server-communications protocols to rivals on a "reasonable and non-discriminatory" basis. 39 Other, Microsoft should provide information to competitors to allow them to interface with its servers 40 . More controversial was the remedy proposed by the commission to address the tying of WMP to Windows. It suggested two alternatives: one forcing
Microsoft to "untie" the two products and produce a version of Windows without WMP
41
; the other a "must-carry" approach, which would require Microsoft to include its leading rivals' media-player software with every copy of Windows.
The company argued that support for the playing of audio and video was part of the core functionality of Windows. Furthermore, it pointed out that PC-makers were, entitled to install media players made by other firms together with WMP. Microsoft said that forcing Microsoft to produce a Europe-specific version of Windows without WMP would, in fact, impose an inferior product on European consumers. 42 It was hard to discuss that this would be in their interests. Finally an agreement on versions of Windows without a media player took place. A Microsoft press release reported that the company has agreed to adopt the names "Windows XP Home Edition N" and "Windows XP Professional
Edition N" for the versions of Windows it must offer without a media player.
Tying: the important issue about the EU Commision VS Microsoft Case
The Commission presents four conditions that have to be satisfied for tying to be prohibited under Article 82. 43 The first condition is that the tied good and the tying good are separate products; the remaining conditions require dominance in the tied good; that no untied supply is available; and that tying forecloses competition. Concentrating on the first condition, there is an immediate problem of definition. As frequently mentioned by economists, all products can be thought of as "bundles" of individual components. The
Commission argues that whether the tied and tying products are distinct depends on whether there exists "independent demand" for the tied product. Its argument that the tying of WMP to Windows meets the first condition for its abusive tying test then seems to rest on the observation that separate media players are available, and that there is clearly consumer demand for these players. Since the Commission has established that Microsoft is dominant in the tied product, and since no untied version of Windows was available, its test of abuse tries to evaluate to whether tying diminishes competition in the market for the supply of media players.
44
Another way to address the problem of when tying should be interpreted as an abuse of a dominant position is to abandon the concept of "tying" altogether. In the Microsoft case "tying" can be re-interpreted as potential refusal to supply cases. Some argue that the use of a dominant position to achieve benefits in supplying a related market, which would not be obtainable without that dominant position, could be defined to contradict a concept of competition on the merits. In fact, the Commission's analysis is more convincing as its focuses on whether Microsoft's tying practice threatens the existence of rivalry between different media players, without being sidetracked by whether Microsoft's practices allow "competition on the merits".
It is not clear what the difference is between a firm that is "overwhelmingly dominant", as
Microsoft was found to be in market for client PC operating systems, and a firm that is just dominant. The
Commission's terminology highlights a paradox of market definition and dominance analysis.
"Overwhelmingly dominant" could mean that the Commission considers Microsoft to be almost certainly dominant in the supply of client PC operating systems. In contrast, a competition authority finds a firm "dominant" when it has a market share of a little over 40 per cent, then this could mean that there is a sufficient risk that the firm is dominant, and therefore that it is appropriate to apply the obligations of Article 82 of EC competition law to that firm. Even with such an interpretation, it remains doubtful that "overwhelmingly dominant" is a useful addition to the vocabulary of competition policy.
The everlasting problem: Monopoly and Microsoft
Monopoly is the unavoidable outcome of the evolution of capitalist economy. (Figure 17 ) Not only in computer technology, but also in every major industry, the process of capitalist accumulation leads to the big capital firms driving small capital out of the market, with one or several companies eventually becoming dominant. Microsoft is the product of a social system and if Microsoft is a monopolist in this traditional economic sense, then it must be restricting its output and raising price.
Contrarily, Microsoft seems to be selling too many of its products, sometimes giving them out for free.
Traditional economic theories cannot explain Microsoft behaviours and their effects on competition and market efficiency. In the digital marketplace, the fact that there is one dominant firm does not imply that the firm has monopoly market power or that the market is inefficient. Figure 17 , Microsoft's market behaviours do not exhibit any sign of either restricting output or raising price.
Secondly, unlike the firm with increasing marginal cost (depicted in Figure 17 ), computer software generally has a decreasing marginal or average cost because of its high fixed developing software cost and extremely low duplicating (variable) cost, resulting in the typical U-shaped average cost curve. For many digital products, their costs seem to be dominated by the increasing return in all output levels, a pattern observed in many natural monopolies. An efficient market result in such a case is to allow one firm to produce all necessary output in order to achieve the maximum economy of scale 47 .
( Figure 18 ) Therefore, Microsoft's dominance in OS software is an efficient result due to the characteristics of the software industry. When a product has decreasing average cost or an increasing economy of scale, a competitive market often fails to achieve an efficient solution (no firms will produce the product). Therefore, Microsoft's dominance in the OS market may well be efficient.
Increasing returns, network effects, and the interoperability together seem to produce a monopolized but efficient market. All of these concepts indicate some sort of incentives that drive the market toward a single dominant product whereby consumers benefit from its dominance. With network externality, the value of a product goes up as more people have the same product. Microsoft's dominance is simply a manifestation of the network externality which relentlessly drives computer software to standardization. A network externality is an externality related to the number of users for a group of products. (Figure 19 ) However, an externality is no longer an externality if a market price already reflects the price of an external benefit or loss. For example, a computer operating system may have a positive externality in that its value increases as there are more people using the same product. This can be represented by an upward sloping benefit schedule for consumers 48 . Unlike other public goods, software manufacturers can and do raise their prices for that purpose. In this sense, the network externality is fully absorbed by the market price, and as a result there is no externality problem. 49 We can certainly attribute Microsoft's dominance in OS to network effects. is not a quantity; it is a process by which entrepreneurs forecast and discover the preferences of consumers. Microsoft proved to be very good in such task, and punishing the company for its own success does not just weaken a free economy; it is clearly immoral.
The model Windows -WMP
50
Consider a market with one producer of software (Microsoft), selling to heterogeneous software users who only differ with respect to how much they value the existence of the software WMP. production of a complete version of Windows is costly. Altogether, considering the assumption that Microsoft can only either choose to produce one type of Windows version, but not the both types, implies that if the monopoly produces q units, its total production cost is given by (eq. 5.2) I also assume that Microsoft makes decisions in a sequential manner divided into three stages. given by (eq. 5.9)
Now suppose that the "Social Planner" decides on making full complete Windows versions, and selling them to all consumers! Then, the social welfare is given by (eq. 5.10)
Comparing eq. 5.9 with eq. 5.10 yields that full complete versions is socially preferred if (eq.
5.11)
The conditions given in eq. 5.8. and 5.11 are drawn in Figure 20 , which divides the O WMP µ µ − space in three regions: in region I, the unit cost of producing full complete versions is very high comparing to single Windows versions, hence both the social planner and Microsoft will choose single versions. Region III reflects the exact opposite extreme, and, in contrast, region II illustrates a parameter range where a market failure occurs since the monopoly will produce single versions, but full complete versions is socially optimal. The reason for that is because Microsoft is unable to price discriminate between the two groups of consumers.
Summing up, the first region is not what we observe in reality; the third one is the actual situation; and finally the second one illustrates the possible long-run market failure case if the "Regulatory Agency" oblige Microsoft to sell to different Windows packages and consumers don't desire that to happen. So everything is in the hands of demand and consumer's preferences and regulatory agencies should simply follow those trends and not regulate simple because it should be done. There are a lot of pros and cons to evaluate in terms of societal welfare. Note that the model presented could have been formulated so that other conclusion could have emerged as the efficient one. In order to have different conclusions and possible solutions to the so called "Microsoft Monopoly" just play with the parameters and see the consequences in terms of the model.
Software pricing and Market Segmentation
57
Price discrimination according to quality is common in the software industry. The most widely used quality differentiation involves removal of key features from the program and selling the reduced (simple) version to consumers with low-willingness to pay. 
In addition there are η L type users whose utility function is given by (eq. 5.13) Assume that the full version (actual Windows package sold in stores) has already been developed so all development costs are considered as sunk. Assume that the software duplication and distribution of each copy is zero (i.e. zero marginal cost). However, let r φ be the cost of developing a reduced version of Windows without WMP embedded.
Suppose that only the complete version is offered for sale at a price denoted by p. facing the types of consumers, the profit maximizing prices to consider are either a low prices, Ultima ratio, once again different results could have been obtained simply by playing with the parameters of the model above, but the main conclusion is that "it depends" whether it is more profitable for Microsoft to sell two versions as the Commission imposed or just sell one. In any case, Microsoft's profit is just one side of the overall welfare, implying that one also should look to consumer's surplus in the above analysis. I did not do that because this was just to show a sample of what economic models can do in explaining real life situations. From here everything is possible… As a final remark, in this Microsoft saga, regulatory agencies may some day conclude that the costs of constant regulatory battles-legal costs, fines, bad publicity, and bad relationships with governments-exceed the benefits of its Windows monopoly.
Conclusion
A global world with a single marketplace brings also global innovation and greater sources of ideas and inventions 58 . Being first had long implied advantages over later entrants (e.g. Microsoft) but is not longer a guarantee for necessary research must be maintained to stay ahead of competitors.
Monopoly tends to have different effects to owners vis-à-vis consumers. Common wisdom among economists further suggests that the negative impact on consumers tends to dominate relative to the positive profit effects associated with monopoly. This divergence explains, in a word, why governments employ antitrust policies. However, technological progress, network externalities and international competition all represent disturbances relative to the common wisdom outlined above. With the innovation intense competition typical for the information economy, innovation is increasingly driven by companies that gain temporary monopoly power, but enjoy it only for a short time before being replaced by a firm with a better product. Hence, information economy may feature more monopolies than the traditional sectors of the economy, but that these monopolies may harm consumers only for a limited period of time. Indeed, if these market dynamics encourage innovation, consumers might actually benefit from the dynamic efficiency generated by high market concentration. Analogously, the presence of network externalities offers additional strategic instruments whereby incumbent firms might be able to abuse dominant market positions.
With this paper I have tried to picture an overview of the actual and valid EU Competition
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Source: Economist, 1999 , Renner, 2000 UNCTAD, 2001 -Page 22 - 
Note: the price elasticity of total market demand in this differentiated product model is defined as the percentage change in total demand for trucks when the prices of all trucks increase by one percent. The monopoly problem is straightforward. The firm in the graph below is assumed to have monopoly market power and can restrict output and raise price only because it does not face competition. To maximize its profit, the firm operates at the output level when its marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue (Qm). At that output level, market price is determined by the demand (Pm), which is greater than marginal cost (MC). The firm's profit is (Pm -MC) Qm > 0. At Qm level of production, consumers'
-Page 28 -willingness to pay, Pm, is greater than the cost of producing the product (MC). Thus society will be better off if more resources are allocated into this industry leading to a greater output level at Qc and lower price Pc. In the graph below, two lines represent the level of consumer benefits or willingness to pay (WTP) with respect to the number of total users. The lower line shows the average willingness to pay without externality. It shifts upward when we consider externality (with more benefits as the number of users increases). The optimal number of product is Q1 at P1 if the firm can charge the benefit from network externality. If not, the output is reduced to Q2 with a lower price P2. At P2, the marginal cost is below the true consumers' willingness to pay, implying that the product is underproduced.
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If the firm can operate at (Q1, P1), the market does not have an externality problem. On the other hand, if the firm is forced to operate at (Q2, P2), the market is characterized by a network externality. 
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